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LABOR LAW-NLRB Refuses To Apply Related Work 
Doctrine to Construction Site Picketing-
Building & Construction Trades Council 
(Markwell & Hartz)* 
The New Orleans Building and Construction Trades Council, 
an association of craft unions, was engaged in a labor dispute with 
Markwell & Hartz, the general contractor on a construction project. 
In support of its dispute with the general contractor (primary em-
ployer), the Council picketed all gates leading to the job site, 
although some gates had been specifically reserved for the exclusive 
use of those subcontractors (secondary employers) with whom the 
union had no dispute. Employees of the subcontractors refused to 
cross the picket line to perform work pursuant to their employers' 
contracts with the general contractor. Markwell & Hartz filed a com-
plaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging 
that the Council's activities constituted a violation of section 8(b) 
(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act.1 The Board held, two 
• 1965 CCH NLRB 1f 9787. 
1. 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964). Section 8(b)(4)(B) presently 
reads as follows: 
S(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents .•. 
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any 
person engaged in commerce . • . to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course 
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members dissenting, that the Council had committed an unfair 
labor practice.2 The picketing of gates reserved for the exclusive use 
of employees of subcontractors at a construction site is an illegal 
appeal to such employees.3 
Although unions admittedly have an interest in bringing eco-
nomic pressure to bear on employers with whom they have a labor 
dispute, neutral employers also have an interest in being free from 
"pressures in controversies not their own."4 Since the two interests 
frequently collide,5 Congress has attempted to provide the NLRB 
and the courts with guidelines for balancing these interests. Thus, 
sections 7 and 13 generally protect the right of employees to strike 
and engage in other concerted activities,6 while section 8(b)(4)(B) 
specifically prohibits union refusals (or inducements of refusals) to 
perform any services when an object of the refusal is to force one 
employer to stop doing business with another.7 
It is clear that by enacting section 8(b)(4) Congress intended to 
of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or 
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; 
or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce ... where 
in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, 
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, proces• 
sor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing 
or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization 
as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been 
certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9: 
Provided, that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make 
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any ••. primary picketing. 
2. Building &: Constr. Trades Council (Markwell &: Hartz), 1965 CCH NLRB 
f: 9787 [hereinafter cited as principal case]. The order of the Board in the case is 
not included in the report of the decision. 
3. The Board regarded the picketing of the reserved gate as lawful during the 
period that deliverymen were permitted to use it. The Board stated: 
Although a common situs problem is presented where a gate is reserved for both 
neutral subcontractors and persons making deliveries to a struck contractor, a 
balance of the competing interests underlying 8(b)(4)(B) requires our respecting 
the traditional right of labor organizations to appeal to such deliverymen as 
lawful incident of legitimate strike actions against the primary employer. 
Principal case ,i 9787, at 16623 n.22. 
4. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951); see 
Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 679 (1961); Sailors' 
Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549 (1950). 
5. See Local 761, Int'! Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673 (1961). 
See generally Bartley, The Carrier Corporation Case and the Related Work Doctrine: 
Appeals to Neutral Employees as Protected Picketing, 16 LAB. L.J. 294, 295 (1965). 
6. Section 7 provides that "employees shall have the right ••. to engage in ... 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Section 13 states that "nothing 
in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to 
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the 
limitations or qualifications on that right." 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964). 
7. See text of statute quoted note 1 supra. 
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restrict sharply the use of secondary boycotts8-classically defined as 
a "combination to influence A by exerting some sort of economic or 
social pressure against persons who deal with A."9 The original 
statutory provision, however, did not provide any rigid rules for 
distinguishing condemned secondary activity from traditionally ap-
proved "primary" activity.1° Furthermore, the 1959 addition of a 
proviso to section 8(b)(4)(B), which expressly excepts "primary" ac-
tivity from the prohibition,11 serves only as evidence of a congres-
sional approval of the "primary-secondary dichotomy."12 The Board 
and the courts have thus had the responsibility of determining when 
union pressure on secondary employers ceases to be an "intrinsic ele-
ment of an 'ordinary strike.' "13 This question generally arises when 
the picketing which results from a union's dispute with an employer 
extends beyond that employer's workforce,14 his premises,16 or 
both.16 
Initially, the NLRB took what has been described as a "geograph-
ical approach" to the problem.17 All picketing at the premises of 
the principal or primary employer was permissible even though 
directed at employees of secondary employers,18 since "traditional 
primary strike action" has always included efforts "to induce and 
encourage third persons to cease doing business with the picketed 
employer" and "to respect a primary picket line at the employer's 
premises.''19 Section 8(b)(4), according to the Board, "was intended 
only to outlaw certain secondary boycotts, whereby unions sought 
to enlarge the economic battleground beyond the premises of the 
primary employer."20 Thus, only appeals to secondary employees 
8. See, e.g., Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 671 
(1961); NI:.RB v. Denver Bldg. &: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 686 (1951); 
Bartley, supra note 5; Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1363 (1962). 
9. FRANKFURTER&: GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930). 
10. See Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961). 
11. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(a), 73 Stat. 543, 
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964). 
12. See generally United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964); Local 761, Int'! 
Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961). 
13. St. Antoine, What Makes Secondary Boycotts Secondary?, in SournwESTERN 
LEGAL FOUNDATION, llrn INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 5, 17 (1964). 
14. See, e.g., Local 761, Int'! Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961). 
15. See, e.g., Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 
(1950). 
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). 
See generally Bartley, supra note 5; St. Antoine, supra note 13. 
17. St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 17. 
18. See Oil Workers Int'l Union (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949) (picketing 
at primary's dock; secondary employees refused to cross picket line); United Elec. 
Radio &: Mach. Workers (Ryan Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949) (picketing gate 
reserved by primary employer for exclusive use by employees of contractor constructing 
addition to primary's plant). 
19. Oil Workers Int'! Union (Pure Oil Co.), supra note 18, at 318-19. 
20. United Elec., Radio &: Mach. Workers (Ryan Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417, 
418 (1949). (Emphasis added.) 
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which sought to induce a work stoppage at their employer's prem-
ises were thought to be prohibited by 8(b)(4). 
Despite the appropriateness of a geographical approach in situa-
tions involving a location occupied by a single employer, such an 
approach has proved to be an unsatisfactory vehicle for analyzing 
the legality of so-called common-situs picketing. Such picketing may 
occur in any one of the following three situations: (1) the employees 
of the primary employer may be temporarily working at the prem-
ises of the secondary employer;21 (2) the employees of the secon-
dary employer may be temporarily working at the premises of the 
primary employer;22 or (3) the employees of both the primary and 
secondary employers may be temporarily working at a site which is 
not the permanent place of business of either employer (as in the 
principal case).23 In determining the legality of common-situs 
picketing, the Board and the courts have consistently commenced 
their analysis with the NLRB's decision in Sailors' Union of the 
Pacific (1'-Ioore Dry Dock Co.),24 a case involving a ship owned by the 
primary employer which was being unloaded and repaired at the 
dock of the secondary employer. The issue framed by the Board was 
whether the right of the union to picket followed the situs of the 
dispute (in this case the ship on which the employees of the primary 
employer worked) to the premises of a secondary employer.25 Al-
though the Board concluded that the right to picket follows the 
situs of the dispute, it held that the enmeshing of the situs of 
the dispute with the premises of the secondary employer limited the 
scope of permissible primary picketing. The picketing would be 
considered lawful so long as all of the following criteria were 
satisfied: 
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dis-
pute is located on the secondary employer's premises; 
(b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged 
in its normal business at the situs; 
(c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location 
of the situs; and 
(d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the 
primary employer.2s 
In formulating "these tests, the Board's basic aim seemed to be the 
protection of secondary employers from effects greater than those 
21. See, e.g., Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 
(1950). 
22. See, e.g., Retail Fruit &: Vegetable Clerks' Union (Crystal Palace Mkt.), 116 
N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957). 
23. See, e.g., Local 55, Carpenters Council (Professional &: Business Men's Life Ins. 
Co.), 108 N.L.R.B. 363, enforced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954). 
24. 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). 
25. Id. at 549. 
26, Ibid. 
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they would have experienced had their employees been induced to 
refuse to work on the ship at the primary's own place of business. 
The rights that the union would have had if the ship had been 
moored at the primary's own dock followed the ship, provided that 
the consequences of the picketing were similarly limited.27 Thus, 
insofar as the appeal to secondary employees was limited to induce-
ments to refuse to work on the primary's ship, the picketing was 
clearly lawful. 
Although the Board's purpose in Moore was to determine when 
and how unions may picket secondary' employees at a place other 
than the primary employer's premises, the change in the Board's 
personnel after 1952 resulted in the use of an entirely different ap-
proach. The new Board chose to interpret section 8(b)(4)(B) literally 
and consequently all appeals which encouraged secondary employees 
to refuse to work in any one of the common situs situations became 
illegal.28 With this as the Board's point of departure, the Moore 
standards were no longer considered determinative of when and 
where secondary employees could be picketed; they could not be 
picketed at all. Rather than discarding lvloore as irrelevant, however, 
the Board used the standards for determining the subjects at whom 
the picketing was aimed.29 Any picketing which did not meet the 
four tests was thus deemed to be aimed at secondary employees and 
was, therefore, unlawful. 
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court "stepped in to rechart 
the direction of the law."30 In General Electric, the Board, pursuant 
to its literal approach to section 8(b)(4)(B), had held that the picket-
ing of those gates to the primary employer's manufacturing plant 
27. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 21. 
28. See, e.g., Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks' Union (Crystal Palace Mkt.), 116 
N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957) (picketing at market place 
owned by primary and operated by primary and secondary lessees); Local 55, Car-
penters Council (Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co.), 108 N.L.R.B. 363, en-
forced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954) (picketing construction site owned by primary who 
acted as his own general contractor); Local 618, Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Indus. 
Employees Union (Incorporated Oil Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. 1844 (1956), rev'd, 249 F.2d 332 
(8th Cir. 1957) (picketed primary's gas station when only persons present were con-
struction employees rebuilding a structure on the premises); Union de Trabajadores da 
Ia Gonzales Chem. Indus., 128 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1960), rev'd sub nom. Teamsters Union v. 
NLRB, 293 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (picketing at primary's plant directed 
at construction workers erecting an addition); Local 761, Int'I Union of Elec., Radio & 
Mach. Workers (General Electric Co.), 123 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1959), rev'd, 366 U.S. 667 
(1961). 
29. See cases cited note 28 supra. Compare Seafarers' Int'l Union (Salt Dome Prod. 
Co.), 119 N.L.R.B. 1638 (1958), rev'd, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959) in which the court 
seems to revert to an analysis much like that in Moore in that appeals directed to 
secondary employees were held not to be prohibited simply because they were so 
directed. Rather, they were prohibited only when they were aimed at a boycott of the 
secondary employer broader than its business relation with the primary employer. See 
Lesnick, supra note 8, at 1374-84. 
30. St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 26. 
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which were reserved for the exclusive use of secondary employees 
was prohibited because such picketing was obviously a direct appeal 
to the secondary employees.31 The Supreme Court reversed the 
Board's decision and expressly repudiated the theory that all appeals 
to secondary employees are illegal.32 The Court held that picketing 
aimed at secondary employees who perform work that it related to 
the day-to-day operations of the primary employer is within the 
scope of protected primary activity.33 
Notwithstanding the General Electric decision, the Board refused 
to make the related work inquiry in the principal case. As it had 
done in the past, the Board applied the Moore test, determined that 
the picketing was aimed at secondary employees, and concluded 
that such conduct was unlawful. In refusing to apply the related 
work doctrine, the Board indicated that the Supreme Court had 
intended the doctrine to be applicable only to picketing which 
occurs at the premises of the primary employer.34 Although the 
Board's position does seem to be supported by the facts in Gen-
eral Electric, a second Supreme Court decision, United Steel-
workers v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.),85 casts doubt upon the Board's 
conclusion. As in General Electric, the picketing in Carrier occurred 
at a gate of a struck manufacturing plant, which gate was reserved 
for the exclusive use of the secondary employees. Although the gate 
was adjacent to the primary's plant (it had, in fact, been owned by 
the primary at one time), it was located on property owned by the 
secondary employer. In holding that the picketing was lawful, the 
Court referred to the 1959 proviso expressly excepting primary 
picketing from the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4), and stated that 
the scope of protected union activity must be determined by the 
31. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio &: Mach. Workers, 123 N.L.R.B. 1547 
(1959). 
32. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961). 
33. In the General Electric case, the Court stated: 
Where the work done by the secondary employees is unrelated to the normal 
operations of the primary employer, it is difficult to perceive how the pressure of 
picketing the entire situs is any less on the neutral employer merely because the 
picketing takes place at property owned by the struck employer. The application 
of the Dry Dock tests to limit the picketing effects to the employees of the employer 
against whom the dispute is directed carries out the "dual congressional objectives 
of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offend-
ing employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers 
and others from pressures in controversies not their own." 
Id. at 679 (quoting in part from NLRB v. Denver .Bldg.&: Constr. Trades Council, 341 
U.S. 675,692 (1951)). (Emphasis added.) 
34. It is plain, therefore, that the Court did not seek to interfere with the Board's 
traditional approach to common situs problems •••• [R]ather, the Court's deci-
sions in General Electric and Carrier Corp., merely represent an implementation of 
the concomitant policy that lenient treatment be given to strike action taking 
place at the separate premises of a struck employer. 
Principal case 'ii 9787, at 16623. 
35. 376 U.S. 492 (1964). 
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interest of the union in "halting the day-to-day operations of the 
struck employer" through economic pressure.86 
The Board's position that the related work doctrine applies only 
to picketing which occurs at the primary employer's premises may be 
supported by the Court's repeated reference in Carrier to the pri-
mary's plant.87 However, there is also language in the opinion which 
suggests that location is significant only insofar as it aids the factual 
inquiry into whether the work of the secondary employees is related 
to the primary employer's everyday operations.88 It would seem that 
the latter rather than the former interpretation is more in keeping 
with the Court's underlying position in Carrier and General Electric 
that neutral employers who contribute to the normal operations of 
the primary employer lose their neutrality, and that appeals may 
be made to such of their employees as do contribute to those opera-
tions.89 The Court's theory is that if the work of the secondary 
employees and the daily operations of the primary employer are so 
interrelated that the cessation of the primary's operations renders 
the services or materials supplied by the secondary employees super-
fluous, the secondary employees are proper objects of primary picket-
ing. By depriving the secondary employer of this outlet for his 
materials and services, the union accomplishes only that which 
would have occurred had there been a successful shut down of the 
primary employer. Clearly, this functional analysis transcends geo-
graphical considerations except to the extent that the place where 
the secondary employees render their services is evidence of the 
relationship between those services and the primary employer's 
normal operations.4° Consequently, it appears that in any common-
36. Id. at 499. 
37. Id. at 499-501. 
38. The Court noted that the gate picketed was on property owned by the secondary 
employer and only adjacent to the struck employer's plant. It then stated: 
[T]he location of the J.>icketing is an important but not decisive factor ••• [that] 
"the picketing was designed to accomplish no more than picketing outside one of 
Carrier's own delivery entrances might have accomplished" ••• [and that] picketing 
at a situs so proximate and related to the employer's day-to-day operations is no 
more illegal than if it had occurred at a gate owned by Carrier. 
Id. at 499-500. 
39. In a series of cases originating and developing the so-called "ally" doctrine, the 
courts have recognized that a similar situation exists when one employer aids a struck 
employer by performing work that the struck employer would otherwise have done, in 
an attempt to break the strike. The secondary employer is regarded as an "ally" rather 
than a "neutral" and § 8(b)(4) is construed to protect only "neutral" secondary em• 
ployees. See NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. 
denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956); Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). See generally Asher, Secondary Boycotts-Allied, Neutral and Single 
Employers, 52 GEO. L.J. 406 (1964); Note, The "Ally" Doctrine Under Section B(bX4XB): 
A Functional Approach, 37 N.Y.UL. REv. 508 (1962). 
40. The only effect on the secondary employer is that he loses a market for his 
goods or services. This result obtains from the very fact that a successful strike closes 
down his customer. In Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the 
union picketed at a shipyard owned by a secondary employer because the primary 
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situs situation the Moore standards are only evidentiary aids for 
determining whether picketing is, in fact, directed at secondary 
employees.41 If it is so directed, General Electric and Carrier seem-
ingly require the additional inquiry of whether the aim of the ap-
peals is to deprive the secondary employer of no more than the 
market for his goods or services that was supplied by the normal 
operations of the primary employer. 
The second, but perhaps primary, reason why the Board refused 
to apply the related work doctrine in the principal case was its con-
cern with the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. 
b Constr. Trades Council.42 In Denver the union had picketed an 
entire construction site in aid of its dispute with a non-union sub-
contractor. 43 The employees of other subcontractors and of the 
general contractor refused to work on the project. The employees 
of the non-union subcontractor, however, continued to work until 
the general contractor terminated their employer's contract and 
replaced them with union workers. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Board's determination44 that the picketing was designed to force 
the general contractor to cease doing business with the non-union 
subcontractor, and thus was a violation of section 8(b)(4). 
In the principal case, the Board argued that the application of 
the related work doctrine to construction site picketing would have 
the effect of reversing Denver.45 Since the Supreme Court had not 
expressly overruled Denver in General Electric or Carrier, the Board 
was unwilling to do so in the principal case. It appears, however, 
employer's ship was docked there. In upholding the picketing, even though it resulted 
in the secondary employees' refusal to work on the ship, the Court of Appeals said: 
[T)his pressure was the same sort as that felt by an employer when one of his 
major suppliers or customers is being picketed, or that which a contractor feels 
when a subcontractor is struck at a crucial point in construction •••• Here Todd, 
the unoffending employer, bore no more adverse effects than it would have suffered 
had it been working on the Pelican [the primary employer's ship] at a dock owned 
by Salt Dome [the primary employer] several miles away and had the picketing 
been at that dock. 
Id. at 591-92. 
41. Recent Board decisions recognize that the Moore tests are evidentiary guides 
rather than mechanical rules. See, e.g., United .Bhd. of Carpenters (Dobson Heavy 
Haul, Inc.), 1966 CCH NLRB 11 20059 (1965); Office & Professional Employees 
(American Presidents Lines, Ltd.), 1966 CCH NLRB 11 20190 (1966). ' 
42. !l41 U.S. 675 (1951). 
4!l. Section 1 of article 1-B of the Council's by-laws, as cited by the Court, !l41 U.S. 
at 678 n.!l, contained a self-imposed duty "to stand for absolute closed shop conditions 
on all jobs." 
44. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 82 N.L.R.B. 1195 
(1949), enforcement denied, 186 F.2d !l26 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
45. Principal case 11 9787, at 16624. The Board also argued that because the Su-
preme Court rejected the union's contention in Denver that the contractor and sub-
contractor were "allies," Denver was support for the Board's refusal now to apply the 
related work doctrine. The fallacy in the Board's reasoning lies in the premise that 
the "ally" doctrine and the related work doctrine apply to the same factual situations. 
See authorities cited note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
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that the facts in Denver are distinguishable from those in the prin-
cipal case, and consequently the Board need not have felt bound 
by the Denver precedent. In Denver, the union's dispute was with a 
subcontractor on the construction project, not with a general con-
tractor. A subcontractor's normal operations are limited to a specific 
part of the project, and the union's interest is correspondingly 
limited to the closing down of that particular operation. Neverthe-
less, the union had directed its picketing at all secondary employees, 
including employees of the general contractor, without regard to 
the relationship between the work of the subcontractor and the 
work of the general contractor. Since this picketing was designed to 
deprive the secondary employers of any work by their employees 
and to force these employers to refuse to deal with the primary 
employer, it is distinguishable from the questioned activity in the 
principal case where the union's dispute was with the general con-
tractor and the work of the subcontractors who were the objects of 
the picketing was clearly related to the general contractor's daily 
operations. The picketing in the principal case was thus aimed at 
depriving the secondary employers only of that which they would 
have been deprived of had the union been successful in forcing the 
general contractor to halt its operations. 
· These comments are not intended to imply that the principal 
case and Denver are to be distinguished simply by the fact that the 
primary employer was a general contractor in one case and a subcon-
tractor in the other. Instead, the distinction is and must be based on 
a functional analysis of the relationship between the work of the 
secondary employees and the daily operations of the primary em-
ployer. Thus, if the union in Denver had picketed only those 
employees of the general contractor who specifically aided the pri-
mary's employees, the related work doctrine would have operated to 
sustain the union's appeal to such employees.46 On the other hand, 
an application of the related work doctrine may result in a decision 
that picketing of a subcontractor's employees is illegal in a union 
dispute with the general contractor. For example, in Local Union 
No. 55 (Professional and Business Men's Life Ins. Co.),41 the union 
picketed an entire construction project in a dispute with the land-
owner (an insurance company) who was acting as its own general 
contractor. The Board held that the picketing was unlawful be-
cause it was directed at secondary employees (neutral subcontrac-
tors). In discussing this case in General Electric, the Supreme Court 
approved the result, although it rested its decision on a finding that 
"the work done by the . secondary amployees is unrelated to the 
46. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 35. 
47. 108 N.L.R.B. 363, enforced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954). 
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normal operations of the primary employer.''48 Thus, the Court 
implied that the related work inquiry must be made in each case, 
although in the majority of construction cases the subcontractor's 
work will be sufficiently related to the normal operations of the gen-
eral contractor. 
Although it seems clear that the related work doctrine should 
have been applied in the principal case, it is not clear that the ap-
plication of the doctrine will, as a practical matter, consistently 
prevent the evil that the statute was designed to eliminate. Even if 
a union's appeal at a common situs complies with the Moore stan-
dards or is properly encompassed by the related work theory, it is 
still possible that the mere presence of a picket at the project, 
wherever located, will result in a refusal to work by employees of 
all of the employers at the site. As Mr. Justice Douglas has said: 
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since 
it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence 
of a pick.et line may induce action of one kind or another, 
quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being 
disseminated.40 
Thus, although the language of section 8(b)(4) is phrased in terms 
of a forbidden "object," it is questionable whether the related work 
doctrine, which delineates the scope of objects properly appealed to, 
is an adequate protection to secondary employers if pickets do, in 
fact, evoke responses from a secondary employee who is not properly 
an object of the picketing. 
There are at least three possible ways of dealing with the actual 
effects of picketing which otherwise complies with the Moore or 
related work standards: (I) all picketing could be forbidden when 
there is an immediate danger that it will bring about the unlawful 
result, irrespective of the objects of the picketing; (2) all picketing 
which actually accomplishes a forbidden result could be declared an 
unfair labor practice whether or not the union claims to have a 
lawful object; or (3) all picketing limited to primary employees or 
secondary employees who perform related work could be allowed re-
gardless of the actual result of such picketing. It is believed that the 
second proposal is the best solution. The first would probably run 
afoul of the statutory language; if it did not, it would force the Board 
to engage in subjective conjecture of the highest order and such a 
rule may consequently result in the prohibiting of picketing which 
neither aims at nor accomplishes the unlawful result. The third 
proposal possesses the merit of certainty, but, unfortunately, is de-
48. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 679 (1961). 
(Emphasis added.) 
49. Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring, joined 
by Black, J. and Murphy, J.). 
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tached from reality. To allow all picketing which is addressed to 
primary employees or secondary employees who perform related 
work.without considering the actual effect of the picketing on other 
secondary employees is to contravene the policies underlying the 
statute-the protection of secondary employers from pressures which 
infringe upon their neutral status. 50 The simple, workable standard 
is the second proposal which would place on the union the burden 
of insuring that the forbidden result does not occur, a burden which 
the union is uniquely able to carry. The union's responsibility 
would be to utilize internal controls to encourage union members 
to disregard picket lines which are not properly directed at them, 
just as the unions have, in the past, exerted internal controls to 
promote a member's respect for such picket lines. Lawful picket-
ing would not be directly curtailed, but the picketing union could 
no longer condone a secondary employee's refusal to cross a picket 
line when the picket line does not properly appeal to the employee. 
Thus, it appears that the Moore tests should be used as eviden-
tiary guides in determining at which employees the picketing is 
directed and in setting the limits of an appeal to those employees 
who are deemed primary employees. The related work test should 
be applied to determine to which secondary employees, if any, a 
union may lawfully appeal for support in a dispute with the primary 
employer. Finally, picketing which fulfills the Moore or the related 
work test, but which nevertheless results in refusals to work by other 
secondary employees should be deemed to have an unlawful objec-
tive and should therefore be condemned. 
50. See generally Lesnick, supra note 8. The objections in the text to the third 
proposal are based on the present statutory language. However, a recent congressional 
bill, H.R. 10027, would add a proviso to § 8(b)(4)(B) that would except from its 
prohibitions any picketing at a construction site aimed at construction workers regard• 
less of the effect the picketing has on neutral employees. The bill, in effect, proposes 
that picketing at a construction project of the employees of general contractors and of 
subconcontractors be treated just as picketing at a manufacturing plant of employees 
who work in different departments of the plant. The House Committee of Education 
and Labor reported a "clean" bill on H.R. 10027. H.R. REP. No. 1041, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1965). 
